Under its seasoned Cold Warrior, the White House’s diplomatic posture on Ukraine is starting to look more 1972 than 2022.

(Originally published March 18 in “What in the World“) The United States is now digesting the implications of having to invest in a new Cold War—a long, costly and intractable rivalry for influence—on two fronts, Europe and the Pacific. The U.S. will thus need to be able to demonstrate its overwhelming ability to defeat Russia or China individually, but also as a combined force. Whether or not Washington sees itself surrounded by implacable foes (it does), both China and Russia are convinced that the U.S. is dedicated to their downfall.

Former Russian President (and Putin benchwarmer) Dmitry Medvedev, now deputy secretary of Russia’s Security Council, on Thursday accused the U.S. of fomenting Russophobia in order to bring Russia to its knees, warning that Russia had the power to put its enemies “in their place.” All he needed was a shoe to bang, Krushchev-style, on the table.

The U.S. has already signaled its position on negotiating an end to the war with U.S. President Joe Biden’s decision to label Russian President Vladimir Putin a “war criminal” for attacking Ukrainian civilians. The U.S. doesn’t actually recognize the International Criminal Court, which has been investigating alleged war crimes by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as by the Central Intelligence Agency at black site torture facilities around the world. It seems doubtful, however, that the White House will endorse any peace agreement between Ukraine and a nation led by a war criminal.

Nor does the White House appear to believe that Putin is negotiating with any sincerity. The Russian president clearly needs to cut his losses and reach some kind of face-saving deal to create a neutral Ukraine—an idea floated by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Putin and Chinese diplomats. Putin has listed his demands to both Israeli mediators and on Thursday afternoon to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This include neutralization of Ukraine, a disarmament process, a murky “de-Nazification” of Ukraine’s government, and cession of Donbas and Crimea. Despite this, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Thursday Putin had given no indication he was prepared to stop in Ukraine.

It’s thus becoming difficult to tell whether Putin is simply pursuing a longstanding plan to conquer Ukraine and invade Eastern Europe to restore Russia’s Soviet-era greatness, or whether the U.S. is simply cutting off his retreat. Either way, the situation in Eastern Europe seems likely to escalate. Increased U.S. military aid to Ukraine is intended to be used, after all, which (as is always the case in war) won’t be viewed by Putin as a peace overture. U.S public opinion also seems to be quickly moving in favor of confrontation: many Republican Senators who opposed a spending bill last week that included $13.6 billion in aid for Ukraine are calling for Biden to do more for it after hearing Zelensky appeal this week to Congress.

Biden will also likely help drive China further into the growing anti-U.S. camp on Friday when he holds a phone call with Chinese President Xi Jinping. China has been telegraphing its desire to serve a moderator between the two sides and thus demonstrate its great-power status. Beijing has reportedly adopted a policy of what it calls “benevolent neutrality:” supporting Ukraine, but not opposing Russia.

Biden, however, is reportedly going into the call with finger in full wag, ready to repeat his national security adviser Jake Sullivan’s warning that any help for Russia in Ukraine would have severe consequences. In case Beijing hadn’t felt Washington’s full antagonism, Blinken repeated the warning Thursday. It has yet to dawn on policymakers in Washington that honey would attract more Chinese flies than vinegar.

But Biden, one of the oldest Cold Warriors around, isn’t engaging with the world based on America’s real interests or an understanding of modern China or post-Soviet Russia. He appears instead to be using the playbook he inherited when he joined the Senate back in 1973 and commenced a career that included two stints as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Biden’s foreign policy is based on values, which he spelled out in a speech to the U.S. State Dept. in February of 2021. In this view, America is defending itself against Global Authoritarianism, from Moscow and Beijing to Nyapidaw to Sana’a (though China’s threat seems in this speech to be the sin of merely rivaling the U.S. for global power).

How this absolutist view of other nations’ democratic values and human rights record squares with recent overtures to Saudi Arabia, Iran and Venezuela remains to be seen. But countering the inconsistencies in American foreign policy and protecting the credibility of this values-based foreign policy is likely to prove just as costly as it was during the Cold War, perhaps even moreso.